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Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen
The chapters in this volume were w ritten as a collective contribution to the 
current debate in political science and sociology on institutional change. Instead 
of abstract theoretical reasoning, they offer in-depth empirical case studies. The 
underlying assum ption, amply supported by recent literature, is that there is a 
wide but not infinite variety o f modes of institutional change that can meaningfully 
be distinguished and analytically compared. It is also assumed that an empirically 
grounded typology o f institutional change that does justice to the complexity and 
versatility of the subject can offer im portant insigh ts on mechanisms of social and 
political stability and evolution generally.
Empirically the chapters of this book deal with current changes in selected 
political-economic institutions of rich, mostly Western democracies. To us the most 
prom inent theoretical frameworks employed in the analysis of the welfare state and 
of contemporary political economy generally seem singularly ill-equipped to capture 
significant developments underway in many if not all of them. While we join with a 
large literature that rejects the notion that previously diverse political economies are 
all converging on a single model of capitalism, we notice that many arguments in 
support of the idea of distinctive and stable national models lack the analytic tools 
necessary to capture the changes that are indisputably going on in these countries. 
One consequence is a tendency in the literature to understate the extent of change, 
or alternatively to code all observed changes as m inor adaptive adjustments to altered 
circumstances in the service of continuous reproduction of existing systems.
The conservative bias in m uch o f this literature— the widespread propensity 
to explain what might seem to be new as just another version of the old— is at 
least partly a consequence o f the im poverished state of theorizing on issues of 
institutional change. In the absence o f analytic tools to characterize and explain 
modes o f gradual change, m uch of the institutionalist literature relies— explicitly 
or implicitly— on a strong punctuated  equilibrium  m odel that draws an overly 
sharp distinction between long periods of institutional stasis periodically inter­
rupted by some sort of exogenous shock that: opens things up, allowing for more 
or less radical reorganization. As the problem s o f the literature on the political 
economies o f advanced capitalism are sym ptom atic of broader theoretical deficits 
in the institutionalist literature as a whole, we subm it that a close analysis of the
We are g ra tefu l to  th e  p a rtic ip a n ts  ill th is p ro ject for th e  ideas an d  in sigh ts  they  c o n tr ib u ted , and  to 
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domestic com petition to discredit collective solutions to economic and social 
problems, providing strong ideological support for privatization, deregulation, 
self-reliance, and a general opening-up o f social and economic arrangem ents to 
the logic o f ‘free’ competitive markets— not just in the traditionally‘liberal’ but also 
in the so-called coordinated’ m arket economies.
Liberalization, then, may be described both as an inevitable economic adjustment 
in organized political economies to growing internal and external market 
pressures, and as a political strategy of either governm ents overwhelmed by unsat- 
isfiable political dem ands or of business extricating itself through international­
ization from  the profit squeeze im posed on it by labor at the height of its postwar 
power in the early 1970s. As already emphasized, the liberalization of the institu ­
tions of organized capitalism— their ‘disorganization’, as it was called by Offe 
(1985) and Lash and Urry (1987)— took different forms and proceeded at different 
speeds in different countries, due in part to the effects of different institutional 
endow m ents interacting w ith what may in shorthand  be described as identical 
exogenous and, in part, endogenous challenges. Indeed as pointed ou t p rom in­
ently by the economic historian, Karl Polanyi, liberalization always comes with, 
and is enveloped in, all sorts of counterm easures taken b y ‘society’— or by specific 
societies in line with their respective traditions— against the destructive effects o f free, ‘self-regulating’ markets. This, however, must: clearly no t be read with the 
unquenchable optim ism  o f m uch o f functionalist reasoning, which seems to accept as a general premise that liberalization can never be destructive because 
ultimately it will always be balanced by newly invented institutions and m ethods 
o f social regulation. Rather it puts us on  alert that in studying liberalization as 
a direction o f institutional change, we should expect also to observe changes in 
institutions intended to reem bed the very same m arket relations that liberalization sets free from  traditional social constraints.
Transformation without disruption
Institutional change that we observe in the political economies o f today’s 
advanced capitalist societies is associated with a significant renegotiation o f the 
politically regulated social m arket economy o f the postwar period. Im portant 
qualifications notw ithstanding, the current transform ation of m odern capitalism 
is m aking it m ore m arket-driven and m arket-accom m odating as it releases ever 
m ore econom ic transactions from  public-political control and turns them  over 
to private contracts. One particularly intriguing aspect o f this broad and m ulti­
faceted developm ent is that it unfolds by and large incrementally, w ithout 
dram atic disruptions like the wars and revolutions that were characteristic o f the 
first half o f the twentieth century. In fact, an essential and defining characteristic 
o f the ongoing worldwide liberalization o f advanced political economies is that it 
evolves in the form  o f gradual change tha t takes place w ithin, and is conditioned 
and constrained by, the very same postwar institutions that it is reform ing or even dissolving.
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Clearly it is hard to determ ine with any degree of accuracy whether the 
difference between the capitalist political economies of today and of the early 
1950s is greater or smaller than that between capitalism in the middle and at the beginning of Ahe nineteenth century. Perhaps the convulsive transform ations 
associated with the First and Second World Wars did in fact unsettle the societies 
o f western Europe and, to a lesser extent, N orth  America m ore deeply than the 
gradual changes that began to chisel away at the postwar mixed economy in the 
1980s and 1990s. But to us this cannot mean that the changes we are observing 
today throughout the advanced capitalist world are only o f m inor significance, 
o r are merely m odifications on the surface of a fundam entally stable and self- 
reproductive social order. For a few years when one could still speak o f a ‘crisis’—  
usually in the expectation o f a return  to a stable state similar to what the world 
was like when its transform ation began— this might have seemed plausible. But 
ongoing change and its accum ulating results increasingly suggest that the current 
process o f liberalization involves a m ajor recasting of the system o f democratic 
capitalism as we know it, issuing in a social order dissociated from fundam ental 
assum ptions of social integration and political-econom ic conflict resolution that 
underlay the construction o f the postwar settlem ent after 1945.In our view, central properties of the developm ents currently underway in the 
advanced political economies are no t being adequately theorized, nor even fully 
recognized, in the m ost influential theoretical frameworks guiding research on 
political economy and the welfare state. For different reasons, contem porary 
scholarship both on ‘varieties o f capitalism’ and on the welfare state seem to be 
producing analyses that understate the m agnitude and significance o f current 
changes. Hajl and Soskice’s highly influential work on varieties o f capitalism is one example (Hall and Soskice 2001). The fram ework they propose is premised on a 
broad distinction between ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ market economies based on 
the extent to which employers can coordinate am ong themselves to achieve joint 
gains. Differences between the two types of economies are expressed in different 
clusters of institutions— including particular kinds o f financial arrangem ents, 
collective bargaining institutions, vocational training institutions, and welfare 
state institutions— that together support distinctive types o f employer strategies 
in the market. Against popular convergence theories that see all systems bending 
toward the Anglo Saxon model, Hall and Soskice’s argum ent predicts continuing 
cross-national divergence. Specifically, and m ost directly at odds with convergence 
theories, Hall and Soskice argue that employers in coordinated market economies 
who have invested in and organized their strategies around indigenous institu ­
tions will not abandon these arrangem ents in the face of new market pressures. 
While providing a compelling account o f observed institutional resiliency, the 
theory is m uch less suited to understanding contem porary changes. Emphasizing 
divergent employer preferences rooted in preexisting institutional configurations, 
the theory, in fact, seems to regard almost all feedback within a system as positive 
and operating to m aintain traditional structures (Thelen and van Wijnbergen 
2003; Kume and Thelen 2004).
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Similarly in the welfare state literature, the m ost influential theoretical 
frameworks stress continuity over change. Pierson’s agenda-setting work on 
welfare state retrenchm ent paints a picture tha t emphasizes the obstacles and 
political risks o f change. C ontrary to previous accounts, Pierson argues that the politics involved in dism antling the welfare state are no t simply the m irror image 
o f the politics of constructing and expanding it. For instance, even if organized 
labor and Left political parties had been crucial to the construction o f the welfare 
state, their declining political power does not necessarily imperil its continuity. 
The reason, Pierson argues, is that: large-scale public welfare programs are subject to 
im portant feedback effects, as they create new constituencies and beneficiaries that 
develop vested interests in their maintenance. Following Pierson, conventional 
wisdom in the welfare state literature today largely focuses on the difficulties of 
retrenchm ent. As Ftacker points ou t (Chapter 2, p. 40), the dom inant view is that 
while the welfare state is perhaps under greater strain than  before ‘social policy 
frameworks rem ain secure, anchored by their enduring popularity, powerful constituencies, and centrality w ithin the post-war order’.
The prevailing emphasis on institutional stability even in the face of indisputable 
and im portant change points to a general problem in contem porary institutional 
analysis, which has always emphasized structural constraints and continuity. In the 
past, this involved a highly static conception of institutions as ‘frozen’ residues, or 
‘crystallizations’, of previous political conflict. Presently a growing body of work has 
begun to conceive of institutional reproduction as a dynamic political process. 
Recent work on path dependence in particular has emphasized mechanisms of 
increasing returns and positive feedback that sustain and reinforce institutions 
through time. Still, however, increasing returns and positive feedback are more 
helpful in understanding institutional resiliency than institutional change (the following paragraphs draw on Thelen 2004, pp. 27-30).
In fact, when it comes to the latter, the notion of path dependence seems to 
encourage scholars to think of change in one of two ways, either as very m inor and 
more or less continuous (the more frequent type) or as very major but then abrupt 
and discontinuous (the much rarer type). This has yielded a strangely bifurcated literature that links path dependence as a concept to two completely different and in 
some ways diametrically opposed conceptions o f change. Some scholars invoke the 
term  to support the broad assertion that legacies o f the past always weigh on choices 
and changes in the present (e.g. Sewell 1996). Especially studies of transitions to democracy and market economy in contemporary eastern Europe, for example, 
employ path dependence in this way, as in: ‘Path-dependency suggests that the insti­tutional legacies of the past limit the range of current possibilities and/or options in 
institutional innovation’ (Nielson, Jessop, and Hausner 1995: 6). Invoked in this way, 
the concept is to stress the limited degrees o f freedom that exist for innovation, even 
in mom ents o f extreme upheaval. In many such cases, the characterization of change as ‘path dependent’ is meant as a refutation of and an alternative to voluntarist (‘ratio­
nal design’) accounts that view institution-building as a matter of constructing 
efficient incentive structures on a more or less clean slate’ (e.g. Stark 1995).
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Others, however, and often those who insist on a m ore precise definition of 
path dependence, tend toward a very different view o f change, one that is closer 
to a strong version o f a punctuated  equilibrium  model that draws a sharp 
distinction between the dynamics o f institutional innovation on the one hand and 
o f institutional reproduction on the o ther (Krasner 1988). Mahoney, for instance, 
criticizes loose definitions of path dependence and argues that ‘path-dependence 
characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set 
in m otion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties’ 
(M ahoney 2000: 507). By em phasizing the very different logic of contingent 
institutional choice and determ inistic institutional reproduction, this definition 
implies and encourages a strong distinction between ‘critical juncture’ m om ents 
in which institutions are originally formed, and long periods of stasis characterized 
by institutional continuity. Any num ber o f examples could be given here but the 
idea is generally captured in what Pempel calls ‘long continuities’ periodically interrupted  by ‘radical shifts’ (Pempel 1998: 1). In his words: ‘Path-dependent 
equilibrium  is periodically rup tured  by radical change, m aking for sudden bends 
in the path of history’ (Pempel 1998: 3).Claims about relative contingency at historic choice points and relative 
determ inism  in trajectories once chosen are pervasive in the social science 
literature and they are by no means exclusively associated with scholars invoking 
the concept of path dependence.1 In sociology, Ann Swidler has drawn a distinc­
tion between ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled’ times, in which the latter are seen as ‘periods 
of social transform ation’ or ‘historical junctures where new cultural complexes 
make possible new or reorganized strategies o f action’ (Swidler 1986: 278, 283, 
respectively). Ira Katznelson adopts this form ulation and links it to the age-old 
debate on the balance between agency and structure, arguing that structure 
figures heavily in the ‘settled’ while agency reigns in ‘unsettled’ times. He writes 
of ‘multiple possibilities inside unsettled m om ents of uncom m on choice’, such 
m om ents being defined as periods in which the ‘constraints on agency are broken 
or relaxed and opportunities expand so that purposive action may be especially 
consequential’ (Katznelson 2003: 277, 283). This kind o f perspective is reflected, 
am ong others, in Jowitt’s work on eastern Europe, which sees post-Leninist 
societies as ‘genesis environm ents’ characterized by a new openness in which 
‘leaders will m atter m ore than institutions, and charisma m ore than political 
econom y’ (quoted in Stark 1995: 68).
Rational-choice scholarship, too, has mostly gravitated to a m odel of discon­
tinuous institutional change (Weingast 2002: 692), though from  a different s ta rt­
ing point. This is because some of the core premises underlying rational-choice 
theorizing— above all, the view o f institutions as self-enforcing equilibria in which 
behavior is generated endogenously— suggest a sharp line between the logics 
and the analysis of institutional reproduction and change. Here again, there is a 
tendency to see change mostly in terms of dynamics unleashed by some exogenous shift or shock, ignoring the possibility o f endogenously generated institutional 
change that is more than just adaptive (but see Greif and Laitin 2003: 2).2
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Moreover, similar to perspectives such as Katznelson’s that stress agency and 
openness in ‘critical junctures’, the direction o f change (i.e. the reason why a 
particular institutional equilibrium  prevails over o ther possible ones) seems to be 
a function o f factors exogenous to the institutions.3 As Pierson points out, this perspective has little to say ‘about what is likely to happen if a particular institu­
tional equilibrium  does give way’, and in fact the im plication often is that ‘any new 
equilibrium  may be as likely as any o ther’ (Pierson 2004: 143-4). In o ther words, 
where the problem  of change is posed in term s o f breakdown and replacement, 
there is often no sense of a ‘path’ at all.
The analyses offered in this volume suggest that there are severe limits to 
models o f change that draw a sharp line between institutional stability and 
institutional change and that see all m ajor changes as exogenously generated. 
Sometimes institutional change is abrupt and sharp (e.g. see Beissinger 2002). 
However, it is not at all clear that this exhausts the possibilities, nor even that it 
captures the m ost im portant ways in which institutions evolve over time. 
Certainly, the cases examined in this volume do not conform  to a strong punc­
tuated equilibrium  model. On the contrary, they suggest that we m ust avoid being 
caught in a conceptual schema that provides only for either increm ental change 
supporting institutional continuity  through reproductive adaptation, or d isrup t­
ive change causing institutional breakdown and innovation and thereby resulting 
in discontinuity. In short, we argue that equating increm ental with adaptive and 
reproductive minor change, and major change with, mostly exogenous, disruption 
o f continuity, makes excessively high dem ands on ‘real’ change to be recognized 
as such and tends to reduce m ost or all observable changes to adjustm ent for the 
purpose o f stability.
The biases inherent in existing conceptual frameworks are particularly limiting 
in a time, like ours, when incremental processes o f change appear to cause gradual 
institutional transform ations that acid up to m ajor historical discontinuities. As 
various authors have suggested, far-reaching change can be accomplished through 
the accum ulation of small, often seemingly insignificant adjustm ents (e.g. Pierson 
2004 and others on ‘tipping points’). To be able to take due account o f this, we 
suggest that we distinguish between processes o f change, which may be incremental o r abrupt, and results o f change, which may am ount to either continuity or dis­
continuity  (Figure 1.1). From the perspective o f a punctuated equilibrium  model, 
‘real’ change that results in discontinuity takes place through abrupt institutional 
breakdown and replacement (the cell on the lower right of Figure 1.1). Authors 
w riting in this tradition do recognize that there is also incremental change; but they tend to conceive o f this as fundam entally reactive and adaptive and serving 
to protect institutional continuity (upper left cell). In reality, however, there 
often is considerable continuity through and in spite o f historical break points, as well as dram atic institutional reconfiguration beneath the surface o f apparent 
stability or adaptive self-reproduction, as a result of an accum ulation over longer 
periods of tim e o f subtle increm ental changes (see also Thelen 2004). The former, 
which we tentatively refer to as ‘survival and retu rn ’ (lower left cell), is of less
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Figure 1.1 Types o f  in stitu tional change: processes and  results
interest to us in the present context than the latter, which we call gradual 
transformation and which stands for institutional discontinuity caused by 
incremental, ‘creeping’ change (upper right cell).
It is to the exploration of this type of change that the present volume is 
devoted— and, we believe, should be if we want to be able to conceptualize 
properly current developm ents in the political economy of m odern capitalism. 
Rather than big changes in response to big shocks, we will be looking for incre­
mental change with transformative results.4 To move beyond the punctuated equi­
librium  models that are employed, alm ost by default, by m ost political scientists, sociologists, and economists working on institutional change, we have invited 
contributions organized around a theoretically self-conscious investigation o f 
em pirical cases o f institutional change in advanced industrial societies that do not 
fit received conceptualizations. As our volume dem onstrates, such cases are not just frequent but they are also found in core areas o f contem porary political 
economies. Authors were asked to work toward general insights in the character and the mechanism s of the sort o f change they observed within and across 
individual countries. C ontributions were to draw on ongoing or completed 
em pirical work and highlight the significance o f its findings for an improved 
theoretical understanding of institutional change, in particular o f the relationship 
between continuity and discontinuity, and between incremental and fundam ental 
change.
Institutions as regimes
Definitions o f institutions abound. As none o f them  has yet become firmly 
institutionalized in the social and political sciences, a brief conceptual exercise 
cannot be avoided.5 Very generally, institutions may be defined as building-blocks o f social order: they represent socially sanctioned, that is, collectively enforced 
expectations with respect to the behavior o f specific categories of actors or to the 
perform ance of certain activities. Typically they involve mutually related rights and  
obligations for actors, distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate, 
‘right’ and ‘w rong’, ‘possible’ and ‘im possible’ actions and thereby organizing 
behavior into predictable and reliable patterns.
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In this volume we focus on institutions that govern behavior in the political 
economies of advanced capitalism. As we believe in historically grounded concepts 
and theories, this relieves us of the need to define institutions so generally that all 
possible form s o f normative regulation o f social action are covered. For example, 
anthropologists m ight conceive o f mores and customs, like shaking hands with 
everyone present in a certain order when one enters a meeting room, as institu­
tions, provided there are strong enough sanctions against deviating from them. 
Indeed in more conservative social settings in Germany, like a business meeting, 
not shaking hands is very likely to reflect negatively on someone, and those present 
will in one way or other make the deviant feel that they disapprove of what is 
disrespectful and impolite behavior to them.
Mores and customs are no trivial matter. The sanctions that are applied to 
enforce them  may be extremely painful— in the case above, they may mean that 
business is lost to the com petition, or that an overdue prom otion is refused. But 
what is im portant for us in the example is that the sanctions that are available to 
the group to enforce the norm  are strictly informal in nature, as indeed is the ‘insti­
tu tion ’ of the handshake that such sanctions are supposed to protect. Informal 
institutions exist by no means only in prem odern societies; in feet informal norm s 
enforced by com m unity disapproval are universally present in social life. They are, 
however, not the subject o f our study. This is because to the extent that m odern 
economies are political economies— that is, governed by politics— they are mainly 
controlled by norm s and sanctions that are formalized}'
M odern, formal, legal-political institutions differ in a variety o f ways from 
informal, ‘anthropological’ ones, not least in how they change: the form er by 
decision and the latter by cultural evolution. Still, they also have im portant properties in com m on. Foremost am ong these is their obligatory character. Actors 
may and frequently will voluntarily comply w ith the dem ands of an institu tion“ 
alized social norm , either because they believe in its value or because they find 
com pliance with its expedient. This, however, is not what defines an institution. 
Defining o f an institu tion  is, rather, that actors are expected to conform  to it, 
regardless of what they would want to do on their own. Moreover, such expecta­
tions are held, not just by actors directly affected by the expected behavior, but 
by ‘society’ as a whole. Someone who does no t know how to greet people p ro ­
perly in a m eeting room  and in what order will incur the disapproval of all well-socialized middle- or upper-class Germ ans, whether or not they themselves 
have been refused the opportun ity  to shake hands w ith him or her. And in 
a country  w ith an institutionalized right to collective bargaining, an employer 
who turns his shop into a ‘union-free environm ent’ will not just be reproached 
by the unions he has locked out, but also by the courts that will rem ind him of the obligations the law of the land imposes on an em ployer of labor as a m atter 
o f legal duty.
In sum, the institutions in which we are interested here are formalized rules 
that may be enforced by calling upon a third party. Following Stinchcombe 
(1968), it is this possibility of third party enforcem ent that indicates whether
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a rule has legitimacy. As long as the breach o f a rule or the violation o f an expectation, inform al or formal, leads to no m ore than a strategic response by the 
actors directly affected, we are dealing, not w ith an institution, but w ith a more 
or less voluntarily agreed social convention.7 W ith an institution we are dealing 
only if and to the extent that third parties predictably and reliably come to the 
support of actors whose institutionalized, and therefore legitimate, normative 
expectations have been disappointed. This they do not necessarily because they 
identify with the interests of such actors, although they may. Rather, they intervene 
as an expression of moral disapproval (in traditional societies, or on behalf of 
informal institutions), or because they are specifically charged by an organized 
m odern society with ensuring the reliability o f certain expectations of actors with 
respect to the behavior o f others.By emphasizing the obligatory character o f institutions, and in particular o f the 
formal institutions of m odern political economies with which we are concerned, 
we exclude from our discussion em pirical phenom ena and dissociate ourselves from conceptual constructions that would make our subject too broad to be 
meaningful. O ur definition shares with the m ore economistic treatm ents associ­
ated with ‘rational choice’ theory an emphasis on strategic behavior w ithin insti­
tutional constraints, rejecting the shared cognitive templates that some 
sociologists associate with institutions (e.g. Meyer and Rowan 1991). But against 
the rational-choice view of institutions as coordinating mechanisms, we draw 
attention to relations of authority, obligation, and enforcement as opposed to 
voluntarism .8 In this way we distinguish institutions from private pacts or 
conventions that lack third party or societal support and with it, in our definition, 
legitimacy. Pacts or conventions, in o ther words, become institutions only when 
their stability ceases to depend exclusively on the self-interested behavior of 
those directly involved and rather becomes, in a strict sense, a m atter o f ‘public 
interest’.9Defining institutions in this way, we believe we gain at least three advantages. 
First, our emphasis on enforcement as a social process by which institutions are 
translated in behavior distinguishes our approach from the voluntaristic variety 
o f ‘rational choice’ where institutions are seen in functional terms, as facilitating 
coordination for actors to achieve joint gains— which does not allow for the 
possibility o f a gap between the institution as designed and the behavior under 
it. Similarly, at the o ther end o f the spectrum , it sets us off against a view of 
institutions as shared scripts where also, by definition, there is no gap between 
institution and behavior, and therefore no conflict over com peting interpretations 
that could be explored as a source o f change.10 Put otherwise, the way we include 
obligation and enforcement into our concept o f institution, we can explicitly p ro ­
vide for a significant am ount o f ‘play’ in the rules actors are expected to follow, 
and thus for the possibility that institutional change may be generated as a result 
o f the normal, everyday implementation and enactment o f an institution. We will 
return  to this them e shortly when we introduce the concept of an institutional 
‘regime’.
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Second, especially when political scientists write about institutions, the 
question sometimes arises whether policies, like, for example, early retirem ent or 
the provision o f state support to small- and m edium -sized firms, should be 
included or not— and to what extent theories o f institutional change may at the 
same tim e be theories o f policy change. To us this depends 011 the character of 
the policy in question. If a governm ent agrees or refuses to support the American 
occupation o f Iraq by sending troops, this certainly is a policy but we would not 
consider it as an institution. There are policies, however, which stipulate rules that 
assign normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors and provide for 
their public’, that is, third  party  enforcem ent. Thus early retirem ent policies create 
expectations am ong workers and employers with respect to when people become 
entitled to draw a pension from the state, and to the extent that stipulated 
conditions are met, they can consider their expectations to be legitimate and 
indeed go to the courts to have them  vindicated. Policies, that is to say, are insti­
tutions in our sense to the extent that they constitute rules for actors o ther than 
for the policymakers themselves— rules tha t can and need to be im plem ented and 
that are legitimate in that they will if necessary be enforced by agents acting on 
behalf o f the society as a whole.
Third, in colloquial language the word institution is sometimes used for a 
specific category o f actors, usually corporate actors or organizations, rather than 
for legitimate rules o f behavior. The Federal Reserve Bank, for example, certainly 
falls in this category, and so does a state as a whole. Even private organizations 
are sometimes considered institutions, for example, trade unions in Scandinavian 
countries or the Deutsche Bank in the G erm an postwar economy. To us this does 
not pose a big conceptual problem. We suggest that organizations come to be 
regarded as institutions to the extent that their existence and operation become 
in a specific way publicly guaranteed and privileged, by becoming backed up by 
societal norm s and the enforcem ent capacities related to them . A central bank is 
considered an institution because its existence is an outflow of the strongly 
sanctioned state m onopoly on issuing legal tender. It stands for the collectively 
enforced expectation that o ther actors will stay away from printing  m oney and 
instead will accept for paym ent the m oney issued by the central bank. Also, as 
long as trade unions are mere organizations, they can be suppressed and may even 
be outlawed by a hostile government. In some societies, however, where their 
existence and their activities have become protected by collective values and polit­
ically enacted norm s, they constitute a socially sanctioned constraint for economic 
actors. Similarly, a bank is just a bank as long as it is no t perform ing semipublic 
functions in a country’s industrial policy; if it is, however, the opportunities 
and constraints its decisions create for others can be disregarded only at the price 
o f disapproval, no t just by the bank, but also by o ther agents that represent the 
com m unity as a whole.
Sum ming up so for, to us the closest general concept for the kind of institution 
in whose dynamics of change we are interested is that o f a social regime. By regime 
we mean a set o f rules stipulating expected behavior and ‘ruling ou t’ behavior
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deemed to be undesirable. A regime is legitimate in the sense and to the extent that 
the expectations it represents are enforced by the society in which it is embedded. 
Regimes involve rule makers and rule takers, the form er setting and modifying, 
often in conflict and com petition, the rules w ith which the latter are expected to 
comply. In the lim iting case, rule makers and rule takers are identical; in any case, 
relations and interactions between the two are crucial for the content and the 
evolution o f the regime as such. An institution conceived as a regime resembles 
w hat Weber calls a Herrschaftsverband, translated by Guenther Roth as a ‘ruling 
organization’ (Weber 1978 [1956] 53).“ Conceiving o f institutions as regimes not 
only makes them em inently accessible to empirical research as it translates insti­
tutional relations into relations between identifiable social actors. Even m ore 
importantly, as the analyses in this volume confirm, it is only if we can distinguish 
analytically between the rules and their im plem entation or ‘enactm ent’— and, by 
extension, if we can identify the gaps between the two that are due to or open up 
opportunities for strategic action on the part o f actors— that we can capture 
im portant features o f increm ental endogenous change.
In Figure 1.2 we have sum m arized the m ain properties o f institutions as 
regimes. Em bedded in a societal context of supportive third parties that makes 
for institutional legitimacy, we locate our ideal-typical distinction between rule
Society
Third parties
Figure 1.2 Institu tions as regimes
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makers (or institutional designers) and rule takers. Note that we provide for a 
direct feedback from  the latter to the former, which we expect to be o f relevance 
certainly in dem ocratic societies. In order no t to make our Figure too confusing, 
we have decided not to indicate the relations between both  rule makers and rule 
takers with the surrounding society and the values the latter enforces on them. 
Just as the surrounding society affects both parties through the constraints and 
opportunities it creates for socially backed rule m aking and rule enforcem ent, it 
is itself affected by the social and political influence exercised by agents lobbying 
for their interpretation o f social rules and norm s. We will address this in more detail fu rther below.
Defining institutions as regimes has the advantage for us that it directs attention 
to important: sources of institutional change. They all have to do with the fact that 
the enactment o f a social rule is never perfect and that there always is a gap between 
the ideal pattern o f a rule and the real pattern of life under it. In the following we 
will address four facets of this complex relationship for purposes of illustration:
1. As we have learned from  sociologists such as Reinhard Bendix (1974 
[1956]), the m eaning of a rule is never self-evident and always subject to and in 
need o f interpretation. This is relevant especially in the relationship that is indic­
ated in Figure 1.2 by the downward arrow from  rules to rule takers. Life in a 
social, that is, normatively ordered com m unity requires ongoing efforts to develop 
and m aintain a shared understanding o f what exactly the rule says that one has 
to apply to a given situation. As ideal patterns are necessarily less complex than 
real patterns, honest disagreement over how a norm  is to be applied may always 
arise. Rather than simply a m atter of logical deduction, applying a general rule to 
a specific situation is a creative act that m ust take into account, not just the rule 
itself, bu t also the unique circumstances to which it is to be applied. This holds 
for highly formalized norm s, like w ritten law, no less than for informal ones. 
Lawyers know the complexities of subsum ing the em pirical properties o f an 
individual case under a general rule. Recourse to w hat is called in some legal 
systems ‘the will o f the legislator’ is for good reason just one way am ong others 
to discover what a rule really dem ands in a concrete context. This is because no 
rule maker can be assumed to have been aware o f the full variety o f situations 
to which his law m ight in the future have to be applied. In fact he m ight find it 
difficult to rem em ber with hindsight the complex variety of motives that may have 
driven his decision. Sociologists have pointed ou t that typically, clarification of 
the operative m eaning o f formal law presupposes a shared culturally based tacit 
understanding between the actors involved that may, however, either not really 
exist or change over time, in which case the rule in effect changes w ith it. Indeed 
often w hat a rule ‘really m eans’ can be established only by the rulings of a legiti­
m ate authority  charged with adjudicating between different interpretations. Such 
rulings, too, can and are likely to change with tim e and circumstances, which may 
be entirely functional as they may provide a regime with the sort o f ground 
flexibility that it may require for its reproduction.
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2. A related issue is the cognitive lim its of rule makers, which become relevant 
in the downward relationship in our Figure between rule makers and rules. Even 
the honest application in good will of a rule to em pirical conditions may cause 
unanticipated results tha t may differ from  what was intended when the rule was 
written, which in tu rn  may cause its corrective rewriting. On the o ther hand, that 
rules cannot be unam biguously and definitively stated facilitates their creative 
application in uncertain circumstances, keeping them  valid in spite of the 
inevitably imperfect inform ation of their designers on the circumstances of their 
im plem entation. In fact regimes capable of survival in a complex environm ent 
are likely to have built-in feedbacks that inform  rule makers how their rules are 
working out in practice. (In Figure 1.2, these are indicated by the upward arrows 
from rule takers to rule makers.) Supported by in telligence of this sort rule makers 
may then revise the rules, setting in m otion another sequence of practical explo­
ration of their real meaning, observation of their real consequences, and further 
revision in the light o f the latter.
3. Questioning the true meaning o f institutionalized rules happens o f course 
no t only in good will. Rule takers do not just im plem ent the rules made for them , 
bu t also try to revise them  in the process o f im plem entation, making use of their 
inherent openness and under-definition (see the upward arrow in Figure 1.2 from 
rule takers to rules). One advantage of defining institutions as Herrschaftsverbande 
w ithin which rule makers and rule takers interact is that this avoids an ‘over- 
socialized’ (W rong 1961) conception o f hum an actors as is often implied by purely 
norm ative, or cultural, concepts of institution. While sometimes rule takers are 
socialized to follow a rule for its own sake, sometimes they clearly are not, and 
this seems to apply particularly in m odern  societies and economies. To the extent 
that rules impose uncom fortable and costly obligations, less than  perfectly social­ized rational actors may look for ways to circumvent them . Finding loopholes in 
a law is a specialty o f lawyers, especially tax lawyers. Their continuous probing of the boundary  between the legal and the illegal is part of the interpretative strug­
gle that begins as soon as a rule is laid down: it is one m echanism  by which the 
m eaning of a rule is both clarified and modified (‘worked ou t’) in practice. 
Favorable discoveries made by adventurous interpretative entrepreneurs may 
spread fast am ong the subjects o f a regime, forcing rule makers to revise the law 
in order to restore it. Sometimes the only way this can happen is by more special 
rules being added to cover unforeseen cases. As this makes the regime more 
complex, it may further extend the opportunities for inventive opportunists to evade or subvert it to their advantage.
4. Finally, there are limits to the extent to which socially authorized agencies 
o f social control can prevent and correct unintentional or subversive deviation 
from social rules. A case in point is the phenom enon o f illegal em ployment, or 
m ore generally o f the underground economy. Some labor m arket regimes are 
more likely than others to give rise to anom ic behavior of this sort. In fact, under­
ground em ploym ent seems to be most frequent in highly regulated economies. 
Mass deviant behavior in breach of a social or legal regime can often be ended
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only by changing the regime and m aking the behavior legal. Sometimes, however, 
rule makers are willing to live with a great deal of anom ie since the stability of 
a norm  may, as famously pointed out by Durkheim , require that it be broken. For 
example, illegal em ploym ent may furnish a m odicum  o f flexibility to an economy 
that would otherwise be too rigidly regulated to perform  well (what Berger and 
Piore (1980) have some tim e ago described as economic ‘dualism’).
W hat all this am ounts to is that those who control social institutions, whoever 
they may be in a concrete case, are likely to have less than perfect control over the 
way in which their creations work in reality. W hat an institution is is defined by 
continuous interaction between rule makers and rule takers during which ever 
new interpretations of the rule will be discovered, invented, suggested, rejected, 
or for the tim e being, adopted. The real m eaning o f an institution, that is to say, 
is inevitably and because of the very nature o f social order subject to evolution 
driven, if by nothing else, by its necessarily imperfect enactm ent on the ground, 
in directions that are often unpredictable. Indeed the more sophisticated the makers o f a regime are, the m ore they recognize that a good part of institutional 
and political life consists o f unanticipated consequences of their ‘institutional 
design’ decisions, requiring that these are continuously adjusted and revised if 
they are to be made to stick.We conclude this section by noting that, conceived as systems of social interaction 
under formalized normative control, institutions cease to appear as a rigid hardware 
of social life mechanistically relegating actors and action to narrowly circumscribed residual spaces for spontaneous voluntarism and rational calculation. Instead a 
grounded, ‘realistic’ concept of social institutions, as adopted in this volume, em ph­
asizes their being continuously created and recreated by a great num ber of actors 
with divergent interests, varying normative comm itm ents, different powers, and 
limited cognition. This process no single actor fully controls; its outcomes are far 
from being standardized across different sites of enactment:; and its results are 
contingent, often unpredictable, and may be fully understood only with hindsight.12
Dynam ics o f institu tional change; lessons from  the present volum e
What, counts as change? Or, when is a change a ‘real’ change?
As suggested above, the m ost influential frameworks for the study of the political 
economy of advanced countries exhibit a distinct if inadvertent conservative bias, 
in that the sophisticated analytic tools they provide for understanding stability are not m atched by equally sophisticated tools for understanding change. As a 
consequence, whether such frameworks are premised on an equilibrium  model 
(as in the varieties of capitalism literature) or no t (as in much o f the welfare state 
literature), current scholarship is prone to ignore or downplay observed changes, 
o r to code all that appears to be new as a variation o f the old.The chapters in this volum e dem onstrate how m uch is missed when contem ­
porary trends are analyzed from the perspective of these theoretical frameworks.
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Jacob Hacker’s chapter on the US welfare state docum ents a trend toward the 
privatization o f risk across a num ber o f policy areas. The traditional literature on 
the welfare state rightly suggests that m ost large-scale social welfare policies have 
proven very resistant to overt cutback efforts. However, as Hacker argues, ‘the 
conventional story about retrenchm ent appears only half right’, for as he shows, 
risk coverage in the United States has narrowed significantly as policymakers have 
felled to adapt welfare program s to cover new risks that have emerged outside the 
scope of existing policies. As Hacker puts it, in a context in which social risks are 
changing and where the gap between them  and the ‘reach’ of social programs is 
growing, ‘conservatives have not had to enact major policy reforms to move 
toward many o f their favored ends’ (pp. 46-7). Analyses that focus exclusively on 
the lock-in effects characteristic of large entitlem ent program s miss the story of 
a m ajor cle facto shrinkage of welfare state coverage in the United States over the 
past two decades.
The chapters by Jonah Levy and Steven Vogel, on the French and Japanese 
political economies, respectively, make a similar point. Anyone looking for evidence 
of the continued viability of the traditional French and Japanese political- 
economic ‘models’ will find a lot o f it. France has traditionally been considered 
the classic example of a state-led political economy and as Levy points out, the 
French state still looms extremely large in the lives of its citizens. In fact, by many 
conventional measures, like spending and taxation, the state is liigger than ever, 
and certainly no less economically active. However, as Levy argues, if we focus on 
these continuities, we miss an enorm ous and highly consequential transformation: 
the abandonm ent of the traditional dirigiste strategy o f directing capital while 
excluding labor, in favor of a strategy of aggressively prom oting market liberal­
ization while cushioning its social effects. Levy’s account shows how existing state 
capacities, far from  being dism antled, were ‘redeployed’ in a major way during the 
post dirigiste period.
Vogel’s chapter on Japan describes a similar phenom enon. Despite the strains 
o f prolonged economic crisis, traditional Japanese political-econom ic institutions 
have exhibited remarkable staying power. Much remains of the institutions that 
support and sustain Japan’s version of a ‘coordinated’ market economy— like 
long-term  em ploym ent in the area of labor relations, or corporate and financial 
networks. Vogel docum ents these continuities but notes that stability should not 
obscure change, particularly in the way in which old institutions and policies are 
being used in the service o f new ends. Among other things, the corporate ties that 
are often seen as defining a distinctively ‘coordinated’ as opposed to a ‘liberal’ 
model of capitalism are being tapped as mechanisms through which to accomplish 
corporate downsizing and a move toward more liberalized labor markets. 
Liberalization in Japan, that is to say, has unfolded above all by traditional institu­
tions being deployed in novel and, indeed over the long run, transformative ways.
One thing the three cases have in com m on is that they illustrate, as suggested 
by our definition of institutions as regimes, that formal institutions do not fully 
determ ine the uses to which they may be put. This is one im portant reason why
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m ajor change in institutional practice may be observed together with strong 
continuity  in institutional structures. Gregory Jackson’s analysis of Germ an code­
term ination  is a case in point, docum enting as it does profound changes in the 
way codeterm ination has functioned over successive historical periods in the 
absence o f m ajor institutional discontinuity. At its inception, codeterm ination was 
partly intended as an independent, workplace-based counterweight to Germ any’s 
rather radical national labor m ovem ent at the time. By the 1950s, however, works 
councils had been fully though not formally incorporated into the strategies of, 
now m oderate, trade unions. Now, not only did codeterm ination not detract from 
the strength o f the unions, bu t it magnified their voice by providing them  with a 
stable, legally anchored foothold in workplaces across the entire economy. Clearly 
this is change of a quite fundam ental sort although it has taken place within an 
institutional form  that has rem ained recognizably similar, or was reconstructed 
in recognizably similar forms, over a long period of time.
How can transform ative change result from increm ental change, in the absence 
o f exogenous shocks? Institutional structures, our chapters suggest, may be stick­
ier than w hat they do and what is done through them . If the latter changes sig­
nificantly, however gradually, analytical frameworks that take the absence of 
d isruption  as sufficient evidence of institutional continuity miss the point, given 
that the practical enactment o f an institution is as much part o f its reality as its formal 
structure. In this vein, Hacker rightly suggests including in institutional analysis 
the actual consequences o f institutionalized behavior, while Jackson emphasizes the 
possibility o f changing meanings and functions being attached to an otherwise 
stable institution. Similarly, Vogel and Levy point to the different purposes that 
may be pursued by means o f a given institutional arrangem ent, and Deeg locates 
the beginning of a new ‘path’ where a new ‘logic o f action’ is established. The latter 
he defines as a general orientation o f actors that, one might add, operates like a 
‘m eta-rule’ governing the interpretation o f a given structure o f institutional 
constraints and opportunities— whose meaning, as we have argued, is never self- 
evident and therefore needs to be continuously constituted in practice.
Fundamental change, then, ensues when a m ultitude o f actors switch from one 
logic of action to anot her. This may happen in a variety o f ways, and i t certainly can 
happen gradually and continuously. For example, given that logics and institutional 
structures are not one-to-one related, enterprising actors often have enough ‘play’ 
to test new behaviors inside old institutions, perhaps in response to new and as yet 
incompletely understood external conditions, and encourage other actors to behave correspondingly. We will return to the concept of logic of action below.
How institutions change
C ontem porary theories of institutional developm ent mostly locate significant 
change in convulsive historic ruptures or openings. This is not what the essays in this volum e do. Rather than abrupt and discontinuous, they find transformative 
change often to result from an accum ulation o f gradual and increm ental change
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(see also Djelic and Quack 2003: 309-10). Moreover, rather than em anating on 
the outside, change is often endogenous and in some cases is produced by the 
very behavior an institution itself generates. Reminded o f this by their em pirical 
material, the analyses in this volum e provide an angle on institutional change that 
is different from dom inant punctuated equilibrium  models. In particular, they 
docum ent from different perspectives how significant change can em anate from 
inherent ambiguities and ‘gaps’ that exist by design or emerge over time between 
formal institutions and their actual im plem entation or enforcem ent (see also 
Pierson 2004: ch. 4). As several o f our chapters show, these gaps may become key 
sites o f political contestation over the form , functions, and salience o f specific 
institutions whose outcom e may be an im portan t engine of institutional change (see also Thelen 2004).
‘Agency’ and ‘structure’, in other words, do not just m atter sequentially— unlike 
in Katznelson (2003) where institutions mostly constrain and where change 
has to wait for those rare m om ents when agency defeats structure. Political 
institutions are no t only periodically contested; they are the object of ongoing 
skirm ishing as actors try  to achieve advantage by interpreting or redirecting 
institutions in pursui t o f their goals, or by subverting or circumventing rules that 
clash with their interests. Instead o f separating institutional development: into 
periods in which agency m atters m ore than structure or the other way around, 
the aim m ust be to understand, as Deeg puts it, the way actors cultivate change 
from within the context of existing opportunities and constraints— working 
around elements they cannot change while attem pting to harness and utilize others in novel ways.
Overall the chapters of this book suggest to us five broad m odes of gradual but 
nevertheless transformative change that we will call displacement, layering, drift, 
conversion, and exhaustion. We discuss each o f these modes briefly, drawing on 
the contributions to this volum e13 bu t also on a broader literature. After this we 
will close with a consideration o f the lessons the essays assembled here can tell us, 
substantively, about current processes of liberalization in advanced industrial democracies.
Displacement From the perspective o f whole systems (or what some sociologists 
call ‘organizational fields’) change can occur through a process o f displacement. 
In the ‘new’ institutionalism  in sociology, displacem ent happens as new models 
emerge and diffuse which call into question existing, previously taken-for-granted organizational forms and practices (Fligstein 1990, 1997; DiMaggio and Powell 
1991; D obbin 1994; Clemens 1997; Schneiberg n.d). In the political science liter­
ature, the emphasis is typically m ore on political than on cognitive or normative 
factors, with change em anating mostly from  shifts in the societal balance of 
power (see, am ong others, Collier ancl Collier 1991; Skowronek 1995; Huber and Stephens 2001).
For our present purposes, the im portant point (associated above all with the 
works of Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek) is that the institutional frameworks
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that exist in any particular society are never completely coherent. While some 
institutional arrangem ents may impose a dom inant logic of action, these typically 
coexist w ith o ther arrangem ents, created at different points in time and under 
different historical circumstances, that em body conflicting and even contradictory 
logics (O rren and Skowronek 1994, 2004). Beyond this, and equally im portant, 
even w ithin dom inant frameworks there will norm ally rem ain possibilities of 
action that institutions neither prescribe nor eliminate. Where either o f these is 
the case, institutional configurations are vulnerable to change through displace­
m ent as traditional arrangem ents are discredited or pushed to the side in favor of 
new institutions and associated behavioral logics. Such change often occurs 
through the rediscovery or activation— and, always, the cultivation— of alternat­
ive institutional forms. As growing num bers of actors defect to a new system, 
previously deviant, aberrant, anachronistic, or ‘foreign’ practices gain salience at 
the expense o f traditional institutional forms and behaviors.14
Where the institutions and behaviors enacted by displacement through defection come from can vary widely. For example, an older literature in political science drew 
attention to the ‘reactivation’ or ‘rediscovery’ of what Barrington Moore once called 
‘suppressed historical alternatives’ (Moore 1979: 376). Thus Michael Piore and 
Charles Sabel (1984) a ttributed the success of the Germ an political economy in the 
1980s in large part to the survival of institutional and organizational forms (among 
others a vibrant and flexible small business sector and a skill system that preserved 
and prom oted the acquisition of traditional ‘craft’ skills) that had been declared 
anachronistic and irrelevant in the heyday of Fordist mass production. As the terms 
o f com petition shifted in the 1980s, these institutions could be tapped and activated 
to become the basis for alternative competitive strategies premised on what one of 
us has elsewhere called ‘diversified quality production’ (Streeck 1991).
In this volume, a similar logic of change is at work in the chapter by Colin 
Crouch and M aarten Keune. In the two cases they analyzed, change occurred as 
actors ‘worked creatively with institutional materials that were at hand . .  . [by 
virtue of their historicJ legacies, bu t subm erged by m ore dom inant or m ore recent 
practices’ (pp. 84-5). In the case of the rejuvenation o f the Hungarian region of 
Gyor, this involved tapping into and cultivating the W estern-oriented, market 
countenancing practices that had developed alongside and under the dom inant 
state-socialist economy. W hen the tim e came for the transition to capitalism, the 
ruling local elite needed merely to ‘[bring) to the fore the previously secondary 
developm ent path of the region’ (Crouch and Keune, p. 99). Similarly in their 
analysis o f Britain’s transition to neoliberalism in the early 1980s, Crouch and 
Keune show how displacement was facilitated by the related facts that the 
foundations o f Keynesianism had been precarious to begin with, and that they 
had coexisted with alternative institutions and practices firmly anchored in the 
country’s financial sector. The point in both cases is that in critical m om ents or 
periods latent subsidiary ways o f action can be rediscovered, and by switching 
over actors then prom ote them  to dom inance or move them  from the periphery 
of the institutional system to its center.
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Underlying Crouch and Keune’s analysis is an image o f social structure in which different institutions inside one and the same society may em body 
conflicting, m utually contradictory ‘logics’— with one institution requiring or 
licensing behavior that is in principle incom patible with the behavior required 
or licensed by another institution. H um an actors seem to be quite capable to 
operate sim ultaneously in different institutional contexts governed by different 
‘logics’, moving back and forth between them , or playing them  off against one 
another. Also, hum an societies appear to have enough slack, and their causal 
texture usually seems to be loose enough (or cause takes enough tim e to turn 
into effect) to be tolerant of considerable friction between differently constructed 
institutions or action spaces. All societies, in o ther words, are in some way hybrids, 
some more and some less.15
Change through displacement can occur endogenously through the rediscovery 
or activation o f previously suppressed or suspended possibilities. But it can 
also occur through what Castaldi and Dosi call ‘invasion’, in either a literal or 
m etaphoric sense (Castaldi and Dosi n.d.: 24). Literally, invasion refers to the sup­
planting of indigenous institutions and practices with foreign ones, presumably 
those of the victor or occupying power— although we know from  historical work 
that this is never complete and more typically produces hybrids o f one variety or 
another (Herrigel 2000, also Quack and Djelic, this volume). In a broader literat­
ure (e.g. the sociological literature on diffusion) and for our purposes, the m ore 
relevant version o f invasion is the m etaphorical one, which involves the im porta­
tion and then cultivation by local actors o f ‘foreign’ institutions and practices.
Chapter 7 by Deeg provides an example o f change o f this variety. His analysis 
o f contem porary trends in the Germ an financial sector docum ents the coexistence 
o f two different and, in many ways, com peting logics o f action. One is based on 
‘traditional’ German inst itutions including strong long-term  links between banks 
and firms and relying heavily on m utual obligation and trust, and involving what 
Deeg calls a logic o f ‘voice’. The other, closer to Anglo-Saxon countries and indeed 
copied from them , is associated with m ore distant relations both am ong firms and 
between firms and banks that operate according to a logic o f ‘exit’. In Deeg’s case, 
unlike in Crouch and Keune’s, th e ‘new’ institutional forms have not (yet?) come 
to dom inate the old. Rather, both coexist, but with the availability o f the form er 
calling into question the primacy and taken-for-grantedness of the latter.16Crucial to Deeg’s analysis is the idea that change requires active cultivation by 
enterprising actors (in Crouch and Keune’s chapter, by economic elites in Gyor 
and by financial interests in Britain; in Deeg’s chapter, by Germ any’s large com ­
mercial banks). Such actors either see their interests at odds with prevailing insti­
tutions and practices, or they test new behaviors inside old institutions, perhaps 
in a tentative response to em erging new external conditions. Change is most likely 
to be effective if actors are willing to pay a price for their ‘incongruent’ behavior 
(this is the core o f what Deeg means by the ‘cultivation’ of a new ‘path’). This is 
because prom oting new institutions typically requires the exercise of power or the 
expenditure of resources, for example, to underwrite new forms of coordination.1''
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At some point, to pu t it in term s of the m odel we introduced earlier, innovating 
actors may also be able to get rule makers to make changes to the formal institu ­
tions, or rule takers to dem and such changes. In the process, deviant behavior becomes less deviant, and indeed traditional behavior may increasingly run into 
form al and informal sanctions.
O ther variations on the displacem ent them e appear in Chapter 10 by Sigrid 
Quack and M arie-Laure Djelic. Quack and Djelic show how ordo-liberalism — a 
school of economic thought that had been entirely m arginal in Germ any before 
1945— came to shape Germ an com petition law under the pressure o f the 
American occupation governm ent seeking to transplant its antitrust legislation to 
Germany. Here endogenous displacem ent and what we have referred to as dis­
placem ent by invasion come together, illustrating a point that also Deeg makes: 
that exogenous change is often advanced by endogenous forces pushing in the 
same direction bu t needing to be activated by outside support. A similar config­
uration o f forces was at work later in the unfolding complex interaction between 
developm ents in European and Germ an com petition law when in what the 
authors refer to as the ‘public tu rn ’ o f European com petition law, an almost 
forgotten section o f the European Treaty became ‘activated’ by proponents of 
a type of liberalization that no one had envisaged when the law was originally 
w ritten .18 In cases such as these, elements or possibilities of an institution that 
have fallen dorm ant and were for all practical purposes forgotten, may tu rn  into 
crucial resources for actors interested in m aking fundam ental change appear as 
an incremental, ‘natural’ evolution o f an existing social order.
In all of the instances of displacement discussed above,19 change occurred, not 
through explicit revision or am endm ent o f existing arrangem ents, but rather 
through shifts in the relative salience of different institutional arrangem ents within 
a ‘field’ or ‘system’. This type of change, as Chapter 7 by Deeg and Chapter 10 by 
Quack and Djelic emphasize, requires active cultivation by agents whose interests are better served by new arrangements. Deeg’s analysis in particular hints, inci­
dentally, at an im portant, often overlooked relationship between endogenous and 
exogenous change: for external shocks to bring about fundam ental transform ation, 
it helps if endogenous change has prepared the ground. Endogenous evolution of 
a social system may generate potentials that, when activated by interested parties 
in response to changing external conditions, can provide the foundation for a new 
logic o f action (on this see also Schneiberg n.d.).
Layering Institutional change can also occur through a process that one of us lias 
elsewhere, following Eric Schickler, called layering (Schickler 2001; Thelen 2002). 
Paul Pierson has convincingly argued that not just economic institutions but 
also political ones may be subject to increasing returns and lock-in effects. In his 
work on social security, he has dem onstrated how each new client added to a 
pay-as-you-go pension system creates additional vested interests in the m ainten­
ance o f that system. The older the system, therefore, the m ore costly it becomes 
both  politically and fiscally to dismantle it (Pierson 1994; Myles and Pierson 2001).
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Many other kinds o f institutional arrangem ents are subject to this sort o f effect:. 
However, as Schickler points out, this does not preclude change altogether provided 
reformers learn to work around those elements o f an institution that have become 
unchangeable. Layering is the term  he uses to characterize the nature of such 
reform. In his empirical work Schickler shows how, in the case o f the US Congress, 
successive rounds of institutional reform produced a highly‘disjointed’ pattern and 
a much higher degree o f institutional incoherence than prevailing functionalist 
accounts o f congressional institutions would predict.For our purposes w hat is most interesting about change through layering is 
that it can set in m otion path-altering dynamics through a mechanism of what 
we might think of as differential growth. The classic example from the welfare state 
literature is the layering o f a voluntary private pension system onto an existing 
public system. While the established public system may well be unassailable, faster 
growth o f the new private system can effect profound change, am ong other things 
by draining off political support for the public system. In Chapter 2 this m ech­
anism  of change is analyzed by Jacob Hacker, who shows how opponents of 
the public pension system in the United States consciously orchestrated the 
expansion o f individual, privatized retirem ent accounts. Im portantly, the original 
innovations— the introduction of 401 (k) and IRA accounts— appeared to be 
m inor measures and went virtually unnoticed at their tim e o f enactm ent. Their 
subsequent explosive growth, however, am ounted to the rise o f an alternative 
pension system premised on a voluntaristic logic wholly different from  that o f the 
public system alongside which the new arrangem ents had been created.
Bo Rothstein has w ritten of analogous reform  efforts in the Swedish context in which customized private alternatives, for example, in schools or day care 
centers, are offered alongside the uniform  public system (Rothstein 1998). As he 
points out, fundam ental change can be— gradually— effected, not through a 
frontal attack on traditional institutions, but through differential growth o f private 
and public sector institutions siphoning off the support o f key constituencies for 
the latter, in particular the middle class which occupies the politically pivotal posi­
tion. In cases like this, new dynamics are set in m otion by political actors work­
ing on the m argins by introducing am endm ents that can initially be ‘sold’ as 
refinements of or correctives to existing institutions. Since the new layers created 
in this way do not as such and directly underm ine existing institutions, they typ­
ically do not provoke counterm obilization by defenders of the status quo. To the 
extent, however, that they operate on a different logic and grow more quickly than the traditional system, over tim e they may fundam entally alter the overall traject­
ory of developm ent as the old institutions stagnate or lose their grip and the new 
ones assume an ever m ore prom inent role in governing individual behavior.
The chapter by Bruno Palier (Chapter 5) provides an additional example of lay­ering as a mode of institutional change. Palier describes the gradual transformation 
of French social policy over the past two decades. The backdrop to Palier’s analysis 
is the liberalization of French economic policy, which for political reasons had to 
be embedded initially in an expanding conservative welfare state. (This historical
24 W. Streeck and K. Thelen
period and broader context is analyzed in the chapter by Levy.) Palier examines 
the subsequent liberalization o f the welfare state, which may have been an 
inevitable next step forced by the high costs to the state o f full com pensation and 
status m aintenance for the losers o f economic change. Welfare state liberalization, 
as Palier shows, departs from the logic o f the traditional corporatist welfare state, 
and in particular entails increasing reliance on means-tested, minimum-level 
protection paid out of public funds. Im portantly, it also involves ‘activation’ 
instead o f decom m odification or status m aintenance outside em ploym ent. In 
Palier’s account, liberalization policies were designed to avoid generating too 
m uch resistance, proceeding incrementally and w ithout m uch rupture or fanfare, and avoiding a direct assault on existing institutions and policies. In fact, Palier 
notes that reformers introduced change mainly at the m argins and ‘as if their 
purpose were only to fix or com plem ent the system’ (p. 131). New program s were 
introduced alongside the immovable and politically firmly established old ones, 
adding to the ‘enduring realm of social insurance’ based on contributions and on 
a traditional social-conservative logic a wholly new and thoroughly liberal welfare 
regime o f targeted m inim um  benefits financed by taxes. Palier shows how, despite 
their increm ental nature, and despite the fact that they were introduced as 
m inor additions and repairs to make the existing system more stable, the reforms 
set in m otion dynamics that produced a deep transform ation o f the French 
welfare state.20Layering involves active sponsorship o f am endm ents, additions, or revisions to 
an existing set of institutions. The actual m echanism  for change is differential 
growth; the introduction o f new elements setting in m otion dynamics through 
which they, over time, actively crowd out or supplant by default the old system as 
the dom ain o f the latter progressively shrinks relative to that o f the former. Unlike 
Schickler, who mostly emphasizes the institutional incongruence that layering can 
produce, for us it is an im portant question to what extent the fringe and the core 
can peacefully coexist, or whether the fringe can attract enough defectors from 
the core eventually to displace it.
Drift There is nothing autom atic about institutional stability— despite the 
language o f stasis and stickiness often invoked in relation to institutions. 
Institu tions do not survive by standing still, nor is their stable reproduction always 
simply a m atter o f positive feedback or increasing returns (Thelen 2004: ch. 1). 
Q uite to the contrary institutions require active maintenance; to rem ain what they 
are they need to be reset and refocused, or sometimes m ore fundam entally recal­
ibrated and renegotiated, in response to changes in the political and economic 
environm ent in which they are embedded. W ithout such ‘tending’, as Hacker’s 
analysis o f health care policy in the United States illustrates, they can be subject 
to erosion or atrophy through drift. As with layering, change through drift, while 
potentially fundam ental, may be masked by stability on  the surface. Indeed Hacker 
begins by noting that, as o ther analysts have shown, social program s in the United 
States have indeed ‘resisted m ajor retrenchm ent’. Flowever, Flacker also observes
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that the American welfare system has failed to be adapted to cover a set o f 
risks that have newly emerged or increased in salience. The result is a significant 
shrinkage in the social protections enjoyed by American citizens as a m atter o f 
right. Hacker’s analysis suggests that in addition to the formal attributes of institutions, we m ust take account of their im plem entation, and especially of the 
gaps tha t may emerge between the two as a consequence of shifting contextual 
conditions. Analyses that focus only on the continuity o f existing rules miss the 
potential slippage between these and the real world to which they are supposed 
to apply.A disjuncture between social program s and changing profiles o f social risk can 
result from ‘natural’ trends. For example, slow changes in family structures may 
alter the com position o f risk and therefore also de facto welfare state coverage. 
In cases like this, drift occurs w ithout explicit political maneuvering: the world 
surrounding an institution evolves in ways that alter its scope, meaning, and 
function. Drift can also be caused by gaps in rules allowing actors to abdicate 
previous responsibilities. In Hacker’s analysis, changes in the incentives faced by 
employers (as im portant private sector welfare providers in the United States) caused many of them  to scale back their efforts. Again, the result was declining 
welfare state coverage even w ithout m ajor retrenchm ent and indeed in the absence 
o f any public debate or decision at all.Hacker also emphasizes, however, tha t drift does not just happen. Like change 
by layering, change by drift can also be prom oted by political cultivation. The 
difference between the two is exemplified by the different types of change at work 
in the two policy areas that Hacker analyzes. In the case o f pensions where change 
took place through layering, active political sponsorship put new program s in place that could then be upgraded to attract m ore clients. In the case o f health, 
by contrast, where the mode of change was drift, change was above all the result o f nondecisions as conservative policymakers deliberately declined to close em erg­
ing gaps in coverage. In health policy just as in pensions, a stable core rem ained 
due to opponents of the welfare state refraining, for good political reasons, from 
attacking popular old program s directly. But change took place nevertheless— in 
the case o f health by way o f a kind o f passive aggressive behavior refusing to end the ‘slippage’ caused by exogenous developm ents that made existing institutions 
slowly lose their grip. Failure actively to m aintain an institution, that is to say, may 
am ount to actively allowing it to decay.
Parallels exist between Hacker’s analysis of drift in US health care policy today 
and Skocpol’s analysis of civil war benefits, which provides us with another, 
especially dram atic, example of change through drift (Skocpol 1992). Civil war 
pensions, Skocpol argues, could have become the core o f a general public pension 
system had its supporters been able to forge the broader alliances needed to secure 
its political foundation. That they did not succeed in this was, by Skocpol’s 
account, in large measure due to opponents o f expansion being able to invoke a 
connection between civil war pensions on the one hand and the patronage polit­
ics and corruption of the Progressive Era on the other, ‘as a reason for opposing
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or delaying any move toward m ore general old -age pensions’ (Skocpol 1992: 59). 
Failure to extend benefits to new groups m ade the atrophy and ultimate demise 
o f the original system a foregone conclusion: the program  literally died out as civil 
war veterans and their spouses themselves passed away.
Conversion A fourth m ode o f change docum ented in the Chapters below is what 
Thelen (2002, 2004) has elsewhere called conversion. Different from layering and 
drift, here institutions are not so much am ended or allowed to decay as they are 
redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes. Such redirection may come about 
as a result o f new environm ental challenges, to which policymakers respond by 
deploying existing institutional resources to new ends. Or it can come about 
through changes in power relations, such that actors who were no t involved in the 
original design o f an institution and whose participation in it may no t have been 
reckoned with, take it over and turn  it to new ends. Here, too, there are elements 
o f stability and even lock-in. However, whereas conventional increasing returns 
argum ents point to a dynamic in which actors adapt their strategies to existing institutions, conversion works the o ther way around: existing institutions are 
adapted to serve new goals or fit the interests of new actors.21
The redirection of institutional resources that we associate with conversion may occur through political contestation over what functions and purposes an existing 
institution should serve. Political contestation driving change through conversion 
is made possible by the gaps that exist by design or emerge over tim e between institutionalized rules and their local enactm ent. Four sources of such gaps are of 
particular relevance in the present context (see also the discussion in Pierson 2004: 
ch. 4). The first is the cognitive limits of institutions’ builders and associated 
problem  of unintended consequences. As Els ter (2003) and others have pointed out, 
designers of institutions are no t all seeing; they make mistakes and in any event 
they can ‘never do just one thing’ (Pierson 2004: 115). For lister the point is to challenge the presum ption, pervasive in the rational-choice literature, that institu­
tions can be thought of as rational solutions to specific social problems. Elster’s 
analysis, o f successive waves of constitution writing in France, ends on the note 
that behavior in general and institutional design in particular are almost by 
definition irrational— the implication of which could be that they are not amenable to systematic analysis. O ur conclusion here is somewhat less sweeping as we limit: 
ourselves to noting that unintended consequences of institut ional design may offer 
opportunities for political contestation that theoretical treatments that assume an 
identity between design and effect by definition cannot: account for.
Second, institution-building, to the extent that it occurs through political 
negotiation, typically involves compromise. As Schickler has argued, new institu­
tions often constitute ‘com m on carriers’ for coalitions of actors who support 
them  for highly diverse reasons (Schickler 1999; Pierson 2004). The resulting 
ambiguities in the rules that define institutionalized behavior provide space for 
political contestation over how rules should be interpreted and applied. In the 
present volume, an example of this is given by Palier (Chapter 5). Welfare
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state reform  in France, his chapter shows, was prem ised on highly am biguous 
agreements, with all parties accepting the need for reform  in general while 
consensus on any particular reform  was based on widely different understandings o f what the reform was to mean. Similar ambiguities seem to have m ade possible 
economic liberalization in France which, according to Levy, was em bedded in the 
same rhetoric tha t was in the past used to legitimate state planning.
Similarly, as shown in the chapter by Jackson (Chapter 9), the institutions and 
rules governing Germ an codeterm ination were always characterized by deep 
ambiguities as rule makers had in part to leave open their meaning lest they lose 
support from necessary allies. As a result, both the uncertainty that is inherent in 
all rules that need to be applied to varying conditions and the discretion rule 
takers m ust inevitably exercise in following a rule are amplified considerably. 
Jackson’s analysis in fact describes the continuous reinterpretation o f the institu­
tion o f codeterm ination over a long period o f time under widely varying market 
and political conditions. It shows how very different am bitions and purposes came 
to be connected to the same institu tion, causing a considerable am ount o f change 
over time on the background of much formal continuity. Sometimes this was the 
result o f changing power relations am ong the actors involved, altering the way 
the institution was practiced. In o ther periods the environm ent of the regime 
changed, confronting rule takers with new contingencies that made them  apply 
the rules differently or forced rule makers to reinterpret them.
Third, and again echoing points made earlier in this chapter, actors are strategic 
and even those not involved in the design of an institution will do everything in 
their power to interpret its rules in their own interest (or circumvent or subvert rules 
that clash with their interests). Elizabeth Clemens’ work, am ong others, has drawn 
attention to processes through which familiar organizational forms were redeployed 
by ‘marginal’ actors who had been blocked out o f the system— in ways that sub­
verted and underm ined received behaviors and logics o f action (Clemens 1997). An 
example of the strategic use of institutions not of their own making can be found 
in the present volume in Quack and Djelic’s discussion o f multilevel governance 
systems like the European Union (EU). Lower-order institutions regulated from 
above in a multilevel institutional structure are no t once and for all determined by 
the latter: like rule takers in general, those in control of national institutions 
inevitably have some leeway to adjust the supranational rules that apply to them, 
and they can also try to change such rules by putting pressure on rule makers or 
rule enforcers. Moreover, those governed by a national institution which is in turn 
governed by a supranational one often have wide-ranging strategic capacities as they 
can try to use political resources mobilized at one level to influence decisions at the 
other. This, at least, is what the study of interest group behavior in the EU increas­
ingly shows, and it also becomes apparent in the complex stratagems of national 
and international policymakers and judges in the field of European and national 
competition law, as described by Quack and Djelic in this volume.Fourth and as most forcefully argued by Pierson, time matters (Pierson 2004). 
Many institutions— and certainly some of those in which we are m ost likely to
28 W. Streeck and K. Thelen
have an interest— have been around long enough to have outlived, not just their 
designers and die social coalition on which they were founded, but also the exter­
nal conditions o f the tim e of their foundation. Changes in the nature of the chal­
lenges actors face or in the balance of power allow for institutions created to serve 
certain interests to be redirected to very different: and even diametrically opposed 
goals and ends. Time, in other words, and the changes it brings in actors and p rob­
lems, opens gaps that entail possibilities for institutional conversion. An example 
explored elsewhere by one of us (Thelen 2004: chs 2 and 5) are the institutional 
arrangem ents com prising Germ any’s celebrated system for vocational training. 
The ‘founding’ legislation around which this system came to be constructed was 
passed in 1897 by an authoritarian  government and was above all directed against: 
the country’s social dem ocratic labor movem ent. A hundred years later, some of 
the central institutional pillars are still recognizable, even though the system has 
been turned completely on its head in political-distributional terms, serving now 
as a key source o f strength for organized labor and a pillar o f social partnership 
between labor and business. The process of conversion through which this occurred 
was not one of dramatic and sudden renegotiation in mom ents of historic 
rupture— of which Germany of course experienced several over the twentieth 
century. Rather, conversion was the result of ongoing political contestation and 
periodic increm ental adjustm ent through which inherited institutions were 
adapted and fitted to changes in their social, economic, and political environm ent.
Chapter 4 on France by Jonah Levy provides another example o f this m ode of 
change. Levy characterizes the transform ation he docum ents as an instance of 
‘redeploym ent’, consisting of the formidable interventionist powers o f the French 
state being diverted away from industrial to social policy, and in the process also 
from  market correcting to m arket conform ing ends. The failure of the old statist 
m odel precipitated the transition. However, rather than dism antling previous 
institutional capacities (and in the absence o f societal actors to w hom  social policy 
could be handed— itself a consequence of statism as Levy’s work has instructed 
us) political elites redirected them  to new ends. For our purposes, the im portant message o f Levy’s analysis is not so much that state activism continues in France—  
although it does and this is in itself an outcom e of considerable interest. Rather 
it is that the French state has managed to move gradually in a decidedly liberal 
direction, w ith policymakers taking full advantage o f the considerable institu­
tional capacities at their disposal to make change appear less fundam ental than it: 
was, or to make fundam ental change proceed gradually enough so that it was not 
recognized as such.Finally, the chapter by Steven Vogel shows that even in a political economy 
as tightly coupled as the Japanese, change that goes beyond routine adjustm ent is 
possible. Vogel emphasizes the contribution to change o f external shocks, in a sys­
tem in which typically deviation from established rules immediately causes costly 
side effects or painful social sanctions or both. (Somewhat more room  for deviant 
behavior seems to exist for foreigners who are less integrated in existing 
institutions— suggesting a parallel to the chapter by Crouch and Keune, Chapter 3.)
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Even Japanese institutions, Vogel emphasizes, do not only impede change but also 
condition it, facilitating certain kinds o f innovation precisely as they proscribe 
others. Vogel’s analysis describes a process o f gradual liberalization that advances 
by way o f growing variation between firms and sectors, as well as through rede­
ploym ent of key institutional supports for the traditional Japanese system to new, 
m ore liberal, ends (see the redefinition o f lifetime em ploym ent into lifetime career 
support). In this case again, considerable continuities on the surface mask im port­
ant underlying changes resulting from  the way in which traditional rules and 
institutions are reinterpreted and converted to new goals.
Exhaustion We call our fifth m ode o f change institutional exhaustion. We 
include it although, unlike the four others, the processes we have in m ind here 
strictly speaking lead to institutional breakdown rather than change— although 
the collapse is gradual rather than abrupt. As argued m ost famously by Marx, 
social arrangem ents may set in m otion dynamics that sow the seeds o f their own 
destruction. Different from  institutional drift, in which institutions may retain 
their formal integrity even as they increasingly lose their grip on social reality, 
institutional exhaustion is a process in which behaviors invoked or allowed under 
existing rules operate to underm ine these.
Recent work by Avner Greif and David Laitin provides an example (Greif and 
Laitin 2003). Greif and Laitin begin, as we do, with a critique o f theories of insti­
tutions in which change by definition m ust be generated exogenously. By exam in­
ing the divergent fate of governing institutions in Venice and Genoa in the early 
m odern period, they try to specify the conditions under which such arrangem ents 
either become self-reinforcing or self-underm ining over tim e.22 In both cases, 
political institutions were created that provided a foundation for cooperation 
am ong rival clans, generating returns for all. Institutional arrangem ents in Venice 
operated in ways that weakened the clan structure, however, whereas in Genoa 
th e y ‘contained inter-clan rivalry, but did not elimina te it’ (Greif and Laitin 2.003: 
18). In both cases cooperative arrangem ents led to economic prosperity. But in 
the Genoese case this heightened com petition am ong rival elites, not least by 
raising the stakes. In this way the institution gave rise to dynamics that made it 
m ore and more vulnerable and, indeed, self-underm ining over time.
In the present volume, Christine Tram pusch’s analysis of the exhaustion o f 
early retirem ent policies in Germany points ou t that these had originally been 
conceived in a period o f full em ploym ent, to deal in a targeted way with the 
decline o f specific industries. The regime ‘worked’ as long as it applied only to a 
limited num ber o f cases and had not yet given rise to a general expectation that 
workers would be entitled to retire early. Ilowever, as the context shifted to 
high levels of long-term  unem ploym ent, and especially with Germ an unification, 
early retirem ent as an institution became overextended as it was used to facilitate 
restructuring and soften the impact o f redundancies on a massive scale. Since 
early retirem ent was financed by the social insurance system, its extension set in 
m otion a perverse dynamic, driving increases in nonwage labor costs that in turn
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contributed to unem ploym ent, which then for its part lowered the revenue and 
raised the expenditure o f the social insurance system. Over time, early retirem ent 
thus came to consum e the very resources that would have been necessary for its 
continuation, at which point the institution began to yield declining rather than increasing returns.
Yet another facet o f tim e-related exhaustion concerns the age o f an institution, 
which may be m uch underrated as a subject o f research. ‘Young’ institutions 
require elaboration of their meaning in practice, by a sequence of decisions on 
the part of rule makers as well as rule takers. The ‘path’ along which an institu­
tion is ‘worked o u t’ in this sense is shaped by exogenous circumstances as well as a 
myriad of strategic choices, deciding together which of the many possible meanings 
o f a young institution are practically explored and which are foreclosed or left 
behind by the wayside. Institutions may, however, also age. For example, viz. 
Tram pusch, they may m eet ‘limits to growth’ where their further expansion 
destroys or uses up resources that they require for their continued operation. Or 
they may become ever more complex in a process by which, like in the decline of 
a Kuhnian ‘paradigm ’, m ore and m ore exceptions and special provisions have to be 
added to a given set of institutionalized rules, thereby depriving it of its legitimacy or practicability or both.
In Table 1.1, we have sum m arized the m ain properties o f the live types of 
gradual but nevertheless transformative institutional change that we have identified.
Liberalization as gradual transformation
The dom inant trend in advanced political economies, we have stated early in this chapter, is liberalization: the steady expansion o f m arket relations in areas that 
under the postwar settlem ent of dem ocratic capitalism were reserved to collective political decisionmaking. Although liberalization am ounts to a quite fundam en­
tal transform ation, it proceeds gradually and continuously, apart from occasional 
but short-livecl episodes of turm oil like in Britain under Thatcher when the 
Keynesian m odel o f economic policy was replaced with a rediscovered neoliberal model.
W hatever its econom ic and political deserts— on which one can have different 
views— it cannot be doubted that the advance o f liberalism in the countries of 
dem ocratic capitalism is greatly supported by the fact that it mainly moves 
forward only slowly, through what we have called displacem ent, layering, drift, 
conversion, and the exhaustion o f existing institutions and policies. This raises the question— which we can no more than raise here— whether liberalization 
under m odern capitalism is in whatever way a privileged direction o f ‘normal’ insti­
tutional change in the absence o f historic ruptures. Notably, as Levy reports, the instrum ents o f postwar state interventionism  in France were available to prom ote 
liberalization in a way that a liberal state could hardly be used for nonliberal, 
corporatist, or even socialist purposes. Levy’s account confirms that liberalization, 
as already Polanyi knew, tends to come together with a ‘counterm ovem ent’ that
Table 1.1 Institutional change: five types of gradual transformation
Displacement Layering D rift Conversion txh a n stion
D efinition Slowly rising salience New elem ents attached Neglect o f  in stitu tional R edeploym ent o f old G radual breakdow no f subordinate to existing institu tions m ain tenance in  spite o f institu tions to  new (w ithering away) o f
relative to  d o m inan t gradually change their external change resulting purposes; new  purposes institu tions over tim einstitu tions status and  structure in  slippage in 
in stitu tional practice 
on  the g round
attached to  old
structures
M echanism D efection D ifferential grow th D eliberate neglect R edirection,
re in terpretation
D epletion
Elaboration Institu tional incoherence Faster g row th o f new Change in in stitu tional Gaps betw een rules and Self-consum ption:opening space for institu tions created on outcom es effected by en actm ent due to: the n o rm al w-orkingdeviant behavior the edges o f old ones (strategically) neglecting 
adapta tion  to  changing (1) Lack o f foresight:
o f  an  in stitu tion  
u nderm ines itsActive cu ltivation  o f New fringe eats in to circum stances lim its to (u n in tended external p reconditionsa new  ‘logic’ o f  action old core consequences of)
inside an existing E nactm en t o f in stitu tion institu tional design Decreasing returns:in stitu tional setting New institu tional layer changed, n o t by reform generalization changes
siphons off sup po rt o f rules, b u t by rules (2) In tended  am biguity cost-benefit relationsRediscovery and for old layer rem aining  unchanged  in o f in stitu tional rules:
activation o f  d o rm an t the face o f  evolving institu tions are Overextension: lim itsor la ten t in stitu tional Presum ed ‘fix’ external conditions com prom ises to growth
resources destabilizing 
existing institu tions (3) Subversion: rules
‘Invasion’ and  assim ilation re in terpreted  from  below
o f foreign practices C om prom ise betw een 
old and  new slowly 
tu rn in g  in to  defeat 
o f th e  old
(4) Time: changing 
contextual conditions 
and  coalitions open  up 
space for redeploym ent
32 W. Streeck and K. Thelen
‘re-em beds’ emerging and expanding m arket relations. But the redeploym ent 
o f French state capacities after 1983 to social policy was mainly designed to 
‘anaesthetize’ society and ‘demobilize’ potential resistance. Indeed it did the 
job quite successfully, only to become afterward the subject of m ore reform, as described by Palier. Not only was that reform  again presented in am biguous 
ideological terms so as to be acceptable to actors with widely divergent w orld­
views, bu t it was also introduced as a series o f m inor additions and repairs to fix 
the existing system to make it more stable, rather than to replace it.
Liberalization, our chapters show, can take many forms: not only can it be 
advanced by the state, like in France, but state functions can also, like in Germany, be delegated to civil society. The resettlement o f Germ an early retirem ent in the 
collective bargaining system am ounts to a move back from the sphere of social 
rights, in M arshall’s sense, to that of industrial rights. This may well be regarded 
as quite far-reaching change, in spite of the fact that it progressed more slowly and 
went less far than French social security reform. It also represents change towards 
liberalization: instead of ‘de-com modifying’ state legislation, it is now by collective 
contract negotiated under market constraints that early retirem ent is made possi­
ble and paid for. Collective contracts are concluded in the economic rather than 
in the political arena; moreover, they are by definition less universal than social 
rights based on legislation since they apply only to the core and no longer to the 
periphery. Internalizing the costs of early retirement in workers’ pay helps in 
the consolidation o f public budgets. But it also, again, brings in private insurance 
companies and employers with their company-based pension plans who can be relied upon further to prom ote liberalization out of their own interests.
Codeterm ination, too, is undergoing a process o f liberalization, according 
to Jackson, in that its practice is increasingly becom ing enmeshed in and 
circum scribed by market relations. Just as changing capital markets manifest 
themselves in growing pressure by nonstrategic shareholders, changing product 
markets intensify needs for corporate restructuring to defend and increase 
competitiveness. As workforce representatives cannot afford to overlook the 
changed external conditions, they become increasingly part of a join t comanage­
m ent o f change for which the continued economic viability o f the firm is the 
uppermost: goal. While under Germ an institutional conditions restructuring does 
not and cannot result in workplaces being turned into ‘union-free environm ents’, codeterm ination slowly mutates in practice toward the institutional base o f a tight economic com m unity o f face between managers and core workforces.
How powerful and at the same time necessary the slow shift of functions 
between and within institutions is for the progress o f liberalization is dem on­
strated by the Japanese case. In japan there is no welfare state to relieve firms of 
the social obligations they have entered into in the past, nor is there a collective bargaining system to relieve the state o f functions it can no longer perform. 
This seems to be a main reason why liberalization in Japan proceeds even more 
slowly than  in Europe, As Vogel reports and as we have noted above, now small 
adjustm ents are being undertaken within firms themselves, with attem pts to
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expand internal labor markets beyond com pany boundaries and, simultaneously, redefine on the m argins traditional institutions such as long-term  em ployment. 
In a world in which workers cannot distinguish between the social contract and 
their em ploym ent contract, liberalization has a higher threshold to cross and must 
take a different path than in Western social democracies.Could it be that measures of liberalization are somehow particularly suited 
to being imposed gradually and w ithout disruption? Is, in o ther words, the rela­
tionship we observe between gradual transform ative change in institutions and 
liberalization more than historically contingent? Nonliberal reforms in a market 
economy seem to require ‘political m om ents’ in which strong governments cre­
ate and enforce rules that individual actors have to follow, even if they would on 
their own prefer not to do so. Liberalization, by com parison, can often proceed 
w ithout political mobilization, simply by encouraging or tolerating self-interested 
subversion of collective institutions from  below, or by unleashing individual in ter­
ests and the subversive intelligence o f self-interested actors bent on maximizing 
their utilities. To this extent, liberalization w ithin capitalism may face far fewer 
collective action problem s than the organization o f capitalism, and much more 
than the latter it may be achievable by default: by letting things happen that are 
happening anyway. All that may be needed for liberalization to progress in this 
case would be to give people a market alternative to an existing system based on 
collective solidarity, and then give free rein to the private insurance companies 
and their sales forces.
Put otherwise, if we follow Deeg (in this volume) and define a liberal regime 
as one in which exit is favored as a dom inant logic o f action over voice, individual 
actors may find it easier to start a m ovem ent toward liberalization than one 
toward constraining market relations by institutional obligations. This is because 
encouraging others to exit from a previously obligatory social relationship for 
self-regarding reasons may require no more than setting an example, while 
tightening normative controls would need collective rather than individual action 
followed, importantly, by collectively binding decisions. We conclude this chapter 
by speculating that it may not be by accident that it is predom inantly through our 
five modes o f gradual yet transform ative change— displacem ent o f dom inant with 
dorm ant institutions, institutional layering and subsequent differential growth, 
tolerated drift of institutions away from social reality, slow conversion o f existing 
institutions to new purposes, and exhaustion due to systemic incom patibility 
and erosion of resources— that the current liberalization of advanced political 
economies mainly proceeds.
Notes
1. Nor, conversely, do  all p a th  d ep en dence theo rists  subscribe to  a stro ng  p un ctua ted  
eq u ilib riu m  m odel o f change.
2. As Barry Weingast has argued: ‘R ational choice theo ry  provides a variety o f m echanism s 
that afford p redictions o f d isco n tinu o us change’. However, questions o f  ‘endogenous
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em ergence, choice and  survival o f  in stitu tio n s’ he regards as ‘fron tier issues’ (W eingast 
2002: 692).
3. T he d ifference is that, in the h istorical in stitu tion alis t version, ‘new ’ arrang em en ts  are 
m ostly  assum ed  to  be very d ifferent from  the ‘o ld ’ ones as a result. In th e  ra tional choice 
version th e  d istance betw een the new  an d  the o ld  eq u ilib riu m  could  in  fact be small; 
th e  change, in o th er w ords, need n o t be particu la rly  ‘b ig ’.
4. Djelic an d  Q uack  (2003: 309) have also d raw n  a tte n tio n  to  the p h e n o m en o n  o f ‘in cre­
m ental b u t consequen tia l change’ and, fo r m etaphorica l illustration  o f  the m echanism  
b eh in d  such change, p ropose a ‘stalactite m odel o f  change’. See their c o n trib u tio n  to 
this volum e.
5. For an excellent overview  see Voss (2001).
6. We deliberately  say ‘m ainly’ as we do  n o t generally  p rec lu de that in form al sanctions 
may also be o f  im portance. Typically, however, as C olin  C rouch  rem inds us, these are 
today stud ied  by lawyers as ‘soft law’, ind ica ting  that in m o d ern  societies even in fo r­
m al ru les, like those governing  certa in  p ro d u c tio n  netw orks, may som etim es becom e 
legally enforceable.
7. We m igh t also say: w ith  a private con tract. But this m ay be m isleading since, as 
D urkheim  has po in ted  ou t, ‘in a co n trac t no t everything  is co n tra c tu a l’ (D urkheim  
1984 [1893]: 158), m eaning  that the contract as such is a social in stitu tion  precisely 
because individual con tracts can be and  are enforced  by agencies o f  social con tro l that 
are n o t parties to them .
8. A few ra tional choice scholars have criticized the vo lun ta ris tic  co n ceptio n  o f  in s titu ­
tions charac teristic  o f  th e ir school (see, for exam ple, K nigh t 1992; M oe 2003). But 
even in revision ist versions the trea tm en t o f  pow er is som etim es th in , com ing  in 
m ainly  by v irtu e  o f the fact th a t som e actors n eed  an in stitu tio n  m o re th an  o thers, or 
th a t the o p p o r tu n ity  costs o f revising existing in stitu tion s are d ifferent fo r different 
actors. M ore on  this below.
9. As a result th e ir stability  increases. ‘Self-interest is, in fact, the least co n stan t th in g  in 
th e  w orld. Today it is useful for m e to u n ite  w ith  you; to m o rro w  the sam e reason will 
m ake m e your enemy. T hus such a cause can give rise only  to  tran sito ry  links and  
associations o f  a fleeting k in d ’ (D u rk he im  1984 (1893 ]: 152).
10. By no ting  that in stitu tions are always in terpreted , and thus can be in terp reted  differently, 
we also re in tro d uce ro o m  for agency an d  political conflict that is elim inated  w hen 
in stitu tion s  are conceived e ither in purely  functional te rm s o r as shared  cognitive 
fram es (tak en -fo r-g ran ted  understan d ing s).
11. A policy  m ay give rise to a Herrschaftsverband  to  the extent th a t it creates a d istinction  
betw een policym akers and policy takers. Socially backed corporate actors m ay be 
Herrschaftsverbände them selves, o r may be in clud ed  in th em  at th e ir center.
12. C o n stra in t, o f course, rem ains co n stra in t. In fact as we have p o in ted  o u t above in c r it­
icizing ra tional volun taristic  concepts o f  in stitu tions, enforceable obligation  is for us 
am o n g  the m ost im p o rta n t defin ing  characteristics o f social in stitu tion s. O u r p o in t is 
sim ply  th a t obligations m ay be am biguous and are in any event generally  subject to 
in te rp re ta tio n  and  con testa tion .
13. To be sure, w ithout even a ttem pting  to exhaust the full range o f possible in te rp re ta ­
tions oi th e ir em pirica l m aterial. Each ch ap te r s tands o n  its ow n feet an d  o u r reading 
in this In tro d u c tio n  is n o t in tend ed  to be an y th ing  o th er th an  selective. M oreover, 
em pirica l cases are always m ore com plex than  typological co n struc ts  and may contain  
re la tionsh ips th a t are illustrative o f d ifferent types o f change.
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14. See also Kuran (1991) for an analogous m odel o f change, w hich how ever draws a t te n ­
tion  to  changes in th e  revealed preferences o f  grow ing n um b ers  o f  actors and relies 
m ore heavily o n  a tip p in g  p o in t logic. A no th er exam ple, based m ore on  w hat one could  
call a ‘cascading logic’, is B eissinger’s analysis o f  the developm en t an d  success o f  n a tio n ­
alist: m ovem en ts across the states o f  th e  fo rm er Soviet U nion in the late 1980s and very 
early 1990s (Beissinger 2002). In this case, the im p ac t o f  events and  processes in a 
densely, tem porally  an d  spatially, co nnected  contex t p ro du ced  w hat Beissinger calls a 
‘tida l’ dynam ic, such th a t nationalism  in co u ntries  lacking the stru c tura l p rerequisites 
o f  success ( ‘im probab le  nation alism s’, as Beissinger calls them ) nonetheless succeeded 
as a result o f  linkages to  o th er u n fo ld in g  nation alism s and  the ability  o f politicians to  
‘ride nation alism ’s tidal force’.
15. A lthough  it appears that the closeness o f  in te rin s titu tio n a l coupling, and  th e  degree to 
w hich a society insists on  co n gruence betw een its in stitu tion s, is a variable; see the 
im age Vogel p rojects o f  the Japanese political econom y.
16. N or, in fact, w ou ld  we expect d isp lacem en t ever to be com plete, since th e  prem ise 
o f  these analyses is precisely that d o m in a n t fo rm s never com pletely ‘crow d o u t’ 
alternatives.
17. W ith in  the ra tio n al choice literatu re  on  in stitu tion s  as coo rd in ating  devices, 'te rry  
M oe’s w ork is m o st sensitive to  the co n nectio ns betw een pow er and  co o rd in ation . As 
he puts it, ‘it is coo pera tio n  that m akes the exercise o f pow er possible, and  the prospect 
o f  exercising pow er that m otivates the co o p e ra tio n ’ (M oe 2003: 12).
18. T he logic h ere  is sim ilar to P ierson’s (1996) analysis o f  E uropean social policy. In 
one in stance (the case o f  EU policy on  gender equality ), he shows how  provisions 
ad o p ted  by the EU m em b er states in o ne p eriod — largely sym bolic an d  w itho u t 
m uch  ‘m ean in g ’— were later p icked up  b y  em erg en t w om en ’s g roups, who used these 
p rovisions to  achieve gains at the EU level th a t had  eluded  th em  dom estically.
19. See also the ch ap ter by T ram pusch, w hich analyzes the m ig ra tio n  o f  a particu la r policy 
from  o ne in stitu tion al contex t to  a n o th e r— as it were, to a reserve system  ready to  take 
over as the p rim ary  system  becam e overloaded.
20. It is perh ap s im p o rta n t to  undersco re  the sub tle but: im p o rta n t difference betw een d is­
p lacem ent an d  layering. A cen tral feature in b o th  Deeg’s acco u n t o f  d isp lacem ent and  
Palier’s and  H acker’s exam ples o f layering is d ifferentia l g row th  o f  parallel system s—  
an  expanding  fringe th a t poten tia lly  crow ds o u t a sh rink in g  core. T he difference is th a t 
in Deeg’s case p ro p o n e n ts  o f  change are cu ltivating  a w holly  new  set o f in stitu tion s on  
the fringes o f  an existing system , thus setting  up  a co m p etitio n  betw een two alternative 
logics. In H acker’s and  P alier’s cases, by con trast, innovators are a ttach ing  new 
elem ents to  existing in stitu tion s, effecting change gradually  w ith in  the trad itional 
arrang em en ts  themselves.
21. B uilding new in stitu tion s from  scratch  may take longer than th e  rise o f new  goals o r 
p urposes, so it often  makes sense to  try  to accom plish  new  goals w ith  o ld  in stitu tions. 
This is nicely illustrated  by Levy w ho in his ch ap te r explains the conversion o f French 
sta tism  from  in d ustria l to social policy in p a r t by the fact th a t in stitu tion s o th er th an  
the state th a t cou ld  have ca rried  the new  social policies sim ply  were no t available—  
not least as a result o f statism  itself w hich  by default, as il were, had to be converted 
instead  o f  d ism antled .
22. W here m ost ra tional-cho ice theories see change as em ana ting  from  a shift in  an in sti­
tu tio n ’s p aram eters, G rief and  Laitin  pay a tte n tio n  to w ha t they call ‘q uasi-param ete rs’, 
w hich ‘are assum ed in the rules o f  th e  gam e b u t in reality are p a rt o f  the b ro ad er
36 W. S treak and K. Thelen
contex t w ith in  w hich an  in stitu tio n  is em b ed d ed ’ (G reif an d  Laitin 2003: 3). In  the 
language th a t they  em ploy, th e  q uestion  is w he th er th e  behavioral effects that an 
in stitu tion  generates either expand o r narrow  the range o f  situations (quasi-param eters) 
in  w hich  the in stitu tio n  is self-reinforcing.
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